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Changes in exchange rates have become a prominent issue in Germany
and Japan — due to the enormous appreciation of the Deutschmark and
the Yen. Conventional wisdom suggests that economic activity will be
negatively affected if a currency is going through a phase of appreciation.
The paper emphasizes the impact of the strong Deutschmark apprecia-
tion on structural change and economic growth in Germany in the 1970s
and 1980s. It re-examines the diverging arguments supported in the
so-called "Structural Reports" of the five leading economic research insti-
tutes.
The paper concentrates on three questions:
• first, which was the theoretical background of the discussion,
• second, which were the controversial issues, and
• third, which could be the lessons for Japan's economic policy drawn
from the reports?
The author comes to the conclusion that the strong Deutschmark has
positively affected the German economy as it has increased the pressure
to adjust. However, while manufacturing industries were flexible enough
to reduce their staff quickly, service industries were too inflexible to pro-
vide relief for the labour market. In this respect, Germany can hardly be a
model for Japan. In realizing economic reforms, it has made only little
progress (F1-3, L6-9).Contents
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"While in the long run it is useful to view the
exchange rate as the relative price of
national output, in the short run it is more
useful to view it as the relative price of
national monies"
William H. Branson (Cited from Siebert
[1994:264]).
I Introduction: Structural Change and Structural Reports'
Changes in exchange rates have become a prominent issue in Germany
and Japan for many years — due to the enormous appreciation of the
Deutschmark (DM) and the Yen (¥) vis-a-vis the US Dollar ($) and other
major currencies. Since the early 1970s, when the industrialized world
moved to flexible exchange rates, the effective value of the DM (com-
pared to the weighted value of 18 industrialized countries) has risen by
some 100 percent, the effective value of the ¥ even by some 180 percent
(Figure 1). In both countries, there has been a widespread feeling that
such an appreciation has clearly exceeded the path of the equilibrium
exchange rate and, as a result, has imposed substantial costs in terms of
growing uncertainty, diminishing price competitiveness and resource mis-
allocation. In particular, it is suspected that it has exceptionally pushed up
The paper was prepared for the German-Japanese workshop "Currency Appreciation
and Structural Economic Change" organized by the Center for Japanese Studies of the
Koblenz School of Corporate Management — Otto Beisheim Graduate School (WHU)
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their valuable assistance in writing this paper.the process of de-industrialization as profitability of industrial activities has
diminished compared to that of service activities.




aAgainst 18 industrialized countries.
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.
In this respect, Germany and Japan appear to be identical twins — each
of them has met the same hereditary factors. At a closer look, however,
they rather seem to be brothers of different age and temperament. Ger-
many has been confronted with an exchange rate problem one decade
earlier than Japan. The appreciation of the DM already became a prime
political issue in the second half of the 1960s. The problem came up in
the export-induced upswing of 1964/65 when the German Export Council
warned of a demand pull which would sooner or later lift up prices and
wages. Finally, in spring 1967, the Council recommended a substantial
revaluation but was blamed by the Federal Government, which bannedany thought of a change of the exchange rate. Only in November 1989,
when the new social-liberal government came to power, the DM was re-
valued vis-a-vis the gold parity by some 9 percent. Later, during the turbu-
lent interim period between December 1971 (when the Smithsonian
Agreement was concluded) and July 1973 (when official interventions to
support the $ were stopped), it appreciated by an additional 20 percent.
Until November 1974, just before the first oil price shock, when the wave
of appreciation reached a preliminary peak, the DM had gained by one
third vis-a-vis the $.
Compared to the DM the revaluation of the ¥ was modest in the 1970s.
Although the appreciation of the Yen accelerated in the second half of the
1970s after the first oil price shock, it did not exceed that of the DM. At the
beginning of the 1980s the ¥ still lagged behind the DM by some 30 per-
cent in terms of the effective exchange rate.
Although meanwhile the ¥ has outdistanced the DM, Germany has per-
haps gained a lead over Japan in one respect: it appears to have learnt to
live with a strong currency — and has met this challenge with some suc-
cess. Confronted with a similar problem, economists and policy makers in
Japan may possibly draw some lessons that can help them deal with their
own problems — and prevent them from doing worse.
The following paper emphasizes the impact of the appreciation of the DM
on sectoral structures of the German economy and vice versa during the
1970s. This period was one of the most turbulent in the world economy. It
was heavily affected by disturbances in the international environment, in
particular the collapse of the international monetary system, by the explo-
sion of the prices for energy and other raw materials, by fundamental
changes in the international division of labour and by the persistence ofan almost uncontrollable inflation. It marked the end of Germany's "post-
war time" which has been characterized by high growth rates and full
employment.
The paper is based on the so-called Structural Reports on the structural
developments of the German economy. In view of the continued need for
information and consultation on structural policy, the German Federal
Government has charged five large economic research institutes with the
task of monitoring changes in sectoral structures since the beginning of
the 1960s. These institutes, which have enjoyed full independence in the
course of their work, comprise: Deutsches^ Institut fiir Wirtschaftsfor-
schung (DIW), Berlin, HWWA-lnstitut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (HWWA),
Hamburg, ifo Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (ifo), Munich, Institut fur
Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel, and Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut fur Wirt-
schaftsforschung (RWI), Essen. As the government was interested in a
broad spectrum of views each institute was asked to present its own re-
port. In the years since elaborating the first series of reports in 1979
2 con-
siderable progress has been made in understanding the process of
structural change, the difficulties encountered by enterprises and govern-
mental organizations and the chances of coping with them. As one of the
results, the passionate debate among the five institutes also brought the
initially diverging views somewhat into line.
Although the Federal Government has not necessarily shared all the opinions and con-
clusions expressed by the institutes it has obviously appreciated the high quality of the
reports. It has prolonged the expensive research project several times. Until now each of
the institutes has published five main reports and numerous special reports. In total, the
research is documented in some 50 volumes. The unabridged reports, comprising some
100,000 pages, have been published in German only. An abridged English version of the
reports of the third round (1984-87) was published by the Federal Ministry of Economic
Affairs [BMWi 1988]. All quotations from the original reports and from other German-lan-
guage publications have been translated by the author of this paper.The paper cannot deal with all the facets of the DM appreciation explicitly
or implicitly raised in the course of reporting. Rather, it must stick to the
crucial points. Therefore, it concentrates on three questions:
• first, which was the underlying theoretical background,
• second, which were the controversial issues, and
• third, which are the conclusions for economic policy drawn from the
reports?
As the author of this paper has been actively involved in the research
project — having been in charge of the contributions of the IfW for more
than one decade — his assessment is necessarily biased to a certain ex-
tent. However, he has made a genuine effort to portray the diverging po-
sitions of the institutes in a fair manner.
II Theoretical Background: Links between Exchange Rate and
Structural Change
7 Alternative Models
Explaining exchange rate variability and its impact on economic activity is
clearly an important issue in the literature,. Two types of theoretical mod-
els— structural and monetary ones — are available for explaining the
links between exchange rate variability and structural change. They sub-
stantially differ with respect to the underlying factors, causal relationships
and the time horizon. In some respect, they appear to be rivals rather than
complements.6
Structural Models
• The standard structural model was developed by Balassa [1964] and
Samuelson [1964]. Its basic assumption are the secular shifts of the
price of traded goods relative to non-traded goods: the rate of techni-
cal progress for traded goods being higher than that for non-traded
goods a fast growing economy will experience a decrease in the rela-
tive price of traded goods in comparison to a slowly growing economy
(productivity bias). In a system of flexible exchange rates the cur-
rency of the fast growing economy will appreciate in nominal and real
terms overtime.
• Another model emphasized the changes in the relative price of
traded goods relative to non-traded goods which are caused by shifts
on the demand side [Salter 1959]. With an income elasticity of de-
mand for non-traded goods higher than for traded goods, the relative
price must change in favour of non-traded goods — as the additional
demand for these goods can only be satisfied by domestic production
(demand bias). If an excess demand for non-traded goods exists, the
fast growing economy will experience an appreciation of its currency
in comparison to a slowly growing economy, too.
Both groups of models can explain why even on the assumption that
monetary conditions are much the same in two countries, the exchange
rate of their currencies can diverge from the purchasing power parity
(PPP). This will be the case when the pace of structural change as a re-
sult of alterations in supply and demand conditions differs between their
economies [Heitger 1983, 1987].In structural models with flexible exchange rate the appreciation has an
important function: it is the vehicle for pushing structural change. Due to
the influence of the productivity and of the demand bias the relative and
the absolute price for traded goods falls. In contrast, with a fixed ex-
change rate, if the absolute price of traded goods is fixed by definition, the
productivity bias will increase the profitability of sectors producing trad-
ables compared to those producing non-tradables. In this case only the
rising demand for non-traded goods will bring about adjustment. Evi-
dently, with a fixed exchange rate the process of structural change will be
hampered or even be turned in the false direction.
Monetary Models
• In contrast to structural models which can explain long-term ex-
change rate deviations, monetary models can only focus on short-
term fluctuations. The standard approach can be found in the work of
Frenkel [1976]. In his model, exchange rate variations are deter-
mined by changes in supply and demand conditions on financial
markets. A tight monetary policy in one country, e.g.
1, will cause an
increase in the interest rate and as a result an increase in demand for
the currency of this country followed by an appreciation.
• Another strand of arguments is based on a model by Dombusch
[1974] which incorporates diverging adjustment parameters on com-
modity and financial markets. Its basic assumption is that commodity
prices are sticky in the short run, while asset prices, including those
of foreign currencies, are flexible. Consequently, changes in mone-
tary aggregates can cause an over- and undershooting of the ex-
change rate in the short run: for example, if the interest rate of onecountry rises, the country's assets will become more attractive com-
pared to those of another country. In this case the actual exchange
rate will exceed the equilibrium exchange rate — until expectations of
depreciation will give wealth holders the incentive to adjust their
portfolios.
According to monetary models, an overshooting of the exchange rate can
only happen temporarily. Sooner or later the actual exchange rate must
come back to the equilibrium exchange rate in terms of PPP. Neverthe-
less, an overshooting can be a risk factor for the economy. It can destabi-
lize expectations and make economic activity less attractive. In particular,
it can easily muddle the pattern of resource allocation as it affects trad-
ables producing sectors much more than non-tradables producing ones.
2 Causal Relationships
Structural and monetary explanations of exchange rate variations are
based upon a different understanding of causality. Although the causality
principle in economics cannot be expected to be of deterministic charac-
ter, it is possible to say:
• In structural models the causing variable are real factors — including
structural change — which are, in principle, understood to move prior
to the variable which is affected by them, namely the exchange rate.
• In monetary models only the interest disparity affects the exchange
rate which then is causing changes in the real economic world.
This is important for the predictive power of exchange rate models: in
structural models the long-term path of the exchange rate can be pre-
dicted with acceptable precision on the basis of past and present patternsof structural change. In monetary models only some parts of the exchange
rate variance can be explained as far as they are caused by changes in
money aggregates.
It seems as if the structural approach potentially carries more predictive
power because the dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous vari-
ability is less strict than in the monetary approach. Moreover, in structural
models causality can also run in both directions: if economic agents act
according to their expectations of the future values of certain variables,
then it is possible that the affected variable changes prior to the causing
variable. Accordingly, exchange rate variation may occur earlier and on a
higher level than the variation in the structure of production. In monetary
models the exchange rate can affect structural change, but structural
change does not play a causal role for the exchange rate.
3 Long-term and Short-term Deviations
Finally, structural and monetary models differ substantially with respect to
their time horizon. Structural models can mainly explain secular (non-sta-
tionary) drifts in the real exchange rate as the causing variables — tech-
nology and tastes — usually change gradually and smoothly over time. In
monetary models the causing variables — money supply and interest
rates — can have only a purely transitory (stationary) influence on the ex-
change rate as deviations from the equilibrium will be equalized.
It is evident that these differences have subtle and far-reaching conse-
quences on understanding the long-term development of the exchange
rates of DM and ¥. As a secular rise in the PPP-based exchange rates10
has been observed (Table 1),
3 monetary factors do not appear to be very
successful in explaining this. However, transitory variations of the ex-
change rate, which obviously exhibit long-term behaviour, have also been
observed. They might reflect the impact of short-term changes on mone-
tary aggregates. Therefore, empirical evidence suggests focusing on both
types of models as complements rather than as substitutes.
Table 1 - Cumulative Increase of Real Exchange Rates of Deutschmark
and Yen 1975-1995 (in percent)
3
Deutschmark - • Yen
Consumer price based
Unit labour costs based
"Against 22 industrialized countries.
±0 47.6
41.1 59.1
Source: IMF; own calculations.
 }
4 Exchange Rate and Structural Reports
Structural as well as monetary models played a decisive role in the
Structural Reports for explaining the appreciation of the DM in the 1970s
— although as substitutes rather than as complements. In this respect,
the institutes were often divided into two fractions: DIW, RWI and ifo,
which constituted the majority, preferred to argue within the framework of
the monetary approach. Much of their attention was given to the links
between monetary policy and exchange rate and the impact on structural
change. These institutes were frequently at odds with the German Bun-
Real exchange rates should usually be calculated by using price indices for traded
goods. Institutions such as IMF, OECD or J.P. Morgan produce and publish effective ex-
change rates on the basis of consumer prices and (standardized) unit labour costs.
These calculations might be more or less "distorted" by developments in the domestic
economy. The absence of a real appreciation of the CP-based DM can mainly be ex-
plained by the rise of indirect taxes in recent years.11
desbank for using the exchange rate to stabilize the domestic price level.
In particular, they complained that this strategy would have caused a se-
vere profit squeeze in the industrial sector. IfW and HWWA instead em-
phasized real factors governing the exchange rate path. They welcomed
the appreciation of the DM, which was mainly considered as the response
to the repression of structural change caused by an undervalued DM dur-
ing the period of fixed exchange rates. In contrast to DIW, RWI and ifo,
IfW and HWWA underlined the positive effects of a strong DM as it was
thought to favour structural change in the manufacturing sector.
Ill Controversial Issues: Deviation of Sectoral Structures from the
International Pattern
1 A Normal Pattern of Structural Change?
The discussion was already opened in the early 1970s by a study put for-
ward by Fels, Schatz and Wolter (FSW) [1971] on past and prospective
structural change in the Federal Republic of Germany. One message of
the FSW-study was, as it may be recalled, that Germany became "over-
industrialized" during the 1950s and 1960s: the share of manufacturing in
gross domestic product (more than 40 percent) was significantly higher
than what would have been expected for a "representative" country with
similar per-capita income and population size. Moreover, this share in-
creased over time whereas it decreased in other economically advanced
countries such as the United States, France or the United Kingdom. Con-
sequently, the FSW-study predicted not only a profound exchange rate
adjustment in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton-Woods System but
also major shifts in the structure of production and employment. As Ta-
ble 2 shows, this prediction has been confirmed by current development.12
Since 1970, the share of manufacturing in both gross value added and la-
bour force has decreased and that of the service sector has increased
substantially.
Table 2 - Structure of Production and Employment by Main Sectors in
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tions; banking, insurance, and real estate; public administration; other services.
Source: Central Statistical Office; own calculations.
The FSW-study was based on a long list of econometric research on
structural change pioneered by Chenery [1960] which had revealed that
the level of per capita income can sufficiently explain the "normal pattern"
of sectoral structure and, accordingly, its change over time. The theoreti-
cal background of the study was the so-called "three-sector hypothesis"
developed by Clark, Fisher and Fourastie. The "normal pattern" was iden-
tified for a large sample of countries by OLS regression analysis by com-
bining cross-section and time-series data. An update of the FSW-study by
Donges, Klodt and Schmidt [1986] is given in Figure 2. It shows the fun-
damental deviation of the west German production structure from the
"normal pattern" for selected years. The most striking feature is that in13
1960 and 1970 the share of the secondary sector was substantially above
the "normal level" whereas the share of the tertiary sector was of com-
paratively small size. Since the early 1970s, this deviation has been sig-
nificantly reduced as predicted in the FSW-study.
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Source: Donges, Klodt, Schmidt [1986]; up-dated by the author.
The "normal pattern" or the "three-sector hypothesis" were one focus of
attention in nearly all Structural Reports. It was intensively propagated by
IfW and HWWA as a useful tool for understanding structural trends
— and questioned or even rejected by the other institutes especially by
ifo. Generally, it was doubted whether such a "normal pattern" could be14
empirically clearly identified, theoretically sufficiently explained, and practi-
cally applied in order to make predictions and to give policy advice. For a
long time, DIW and ifo in particular could not detect any secular shift from
manufacturing to services and were not willing to follow the arguments of
IfW and HWWA.
4 The sharp decline in the manufacturing nominal value
added share was interpreted as the consequence of the exorbitant rise in
the real exchange rate of the DM — and not vice versa.
In the 1970s, the "three-sector hypothesis" was far from being popular. In
particular, it was not very appealing for manufacturing firms as it predicted
a sustained de-industrialization of the German economy. Their lobby
could not get to like the idea" that there had been a disequilibrium earlier
which promoted export-led growth. Under these circumstances it is under-
standable that IfW and HWWA saw themselves heavily criticized. The
Federal Confederation of German Industry (the counterpart of the Japa-
nese Keidanren), therefore, usually commented the Structural Reports of
these institutes less enthusiastically.
5
This was also a problem of accounting. While IfW and HWWA examined sectoral output
shares on current prices, DIW and ifo preferred the shares on constant prices. In fact, in
"real terms" the structural shifts were less impressive. However, as it was argued by IfW
and HWWA, changes in the price structure should be understood as an important part of
changes in the sector structure, too, which could not be isolated.
It should be noted that the debate about "de-industrialization" has been a political issue
not only in Germany. It was also intensively discussed in other industrialized countries,
e.g. in the United Kingdom [Kaldor 1978] and in the United States [Lawrence 1984]. Over
here as well as over there, there was argument whether the losses of the manufacturing
sector should be interpreted as a step to normality or as a transitory deviation from the
long-term path of structural change.15
2 Normalization or Overshooting?
At the end of the 1970s, the proponents of the "overshooting hypothesis"
had clearly gained the upper hand. The appreciation of the DM reached a
record, and export industries came under severe competitive pressure:
"There is some evidence", concluded Gerstenberger [1984], who was in
charge of ifo's Structural Reports for many years, "that the exchange rate
of the DM has been clearly 'distorted
1, say overvalued". In fact, empirical
support appeared to come about when the DM was depreciated vis-a-vis
the $ in the first half of the 1980s. In these years the share of manufactur-
ing in gross domestic product slightly increased once more: "As usual,
when the pendulum swings out, a correction will follow in the other direc-
tion" [Gerstenberger 1984: 14].
Consequently, during the 1980s, there was much discussion between the
institutes about the question of how the gains of manufacturing industries
should be interpreted [Klodt 1988]. According to IfW and HWWA, the
share of the industrial sector was still too high compared to international
standards. Therefore, the two institutes expected that these gains would
only be of temporary nature. Even DIW, usually not joining the arguments
of IfW and HWWA, warned to raise unfounded hopes: "Structural change
that relies only on exports can prove to be a wrong turn that must be recti-
fied in the long term, thus causing pressure for renowned structural
change .... Export-led structural change in slow growth periods can be-
come the starting point for new structural difficulties" [cited from BMWi
1988:7].
Looking back, we can say that the period of re-industrialization remained
an episode. With a stronger DM manufacturing industries were once
again exposed to growing competitive pressure from abroad. Not surpris-16
ingly, the structural pattern from the mid 1980s onwards corresponded to
that in the 1970s. As a consequence, the re-industrialization hypothesis
definitely disappeared from the agenda.
Meanwhile, German businessmen and policy makers are obviously
geared to live with a strong DM. Accordingly, their emphasis has been
placed upon another major issue: how can Germany defend its position in
what is called locational competition? In fact, it is hard to fault the argu-
ment that investors are appraising other locations as more attractive
[Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994]. As five million additional jobs are needed to ab-
sorb all the unemployed and underemployed, the discussion is dominated
by an "apocalyptic view" of unemployment which argues that there is no
other solution but a drastic supply side reform — including reorganization
of the tax system, deregulation of the labour market and liberalization in
the field of service activities.
3 Adjustment as Positive or Negative Sum Game?
While the strong DM was welcomed by IfW as a vehicle for pushing
structural change, it was criticized by RWI [1983]: "As the DM shows a
tendency to overvaluation caused by the tight internal monetary policy, the
Federal Republic of Germany has become a high-price economy, in par-
ticular for producers from other industrialized countries which can sell
their products on the German market under relatively favourable condi-17
tions — to the German producers' detriment and to the benefit of German
consumers" [p. 7].
6
At a quick glance, the facts seemed to support neither the optimism of
IfW and HWWA nor the pessimism of RWI: in contrast to their expecta-
tions, German exports were found to expand continuously in the 1970s.
Germany's share in the world markets remained rather stable; the slight
decline from 1974 to 1976 and 1978 to 1981 was mainly caused by the
world-wide recession in the wake of the oil price crisis (Figure 3):
• One part of the firms was able to raise export prices by the rate of ap-
preciation. Obviously, there was an unexploited scope for price in-
crease from the previous period, implying some sort of cost-plus-
pricing on behalf of German exporters, irrespective of what the mar-
ket could bear. In the 1970s, many German firms still believed to hold
a price leadership in world markets.
• Another part accepted a substantial drop in profitability of exports. In
the early 1970s profit margins were still high on average, thanks to
the previous period of fast export-led growth.
No doubt, the international competitiveness of the German industry ap-
peared to be still quite good at that time.
The general impression was that for the time being the majority of manu-
facturing companies adopted a wait-and-see strategy. Possibly, shortly
after the appreciation shock they felt unable to anticipate their future sales
In the early 1990s, the discussion about the impact of a tight monetary policy on struc-
tural change has erupted once again. In a recent article in a German newspaper, Holt-
ferich [1996] critized the Bundesbank for its what he called tight monetary policy, which
has have pushed up the exchange rate of the DM — and has crippled export industries.18
conditions correctly, or to adjust their capacities and staff swiftly, or to as-
sess the consequences of such a negligence adequately.
Figure 3 - Shares in the World Market
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Source: Klodt, Stehn [1994].
In fact, if the exchange rate rises so dramatically that it must be assumed
that it cannot but fall in the relevant future, investors may tend to postpone
far-reaching decisions. During the 1970s many companies might have
placed a bet on a reversing exchange rate. However, there was an unmis-
takable sign that the matter would not brook any delay: the dramatic
change in the double factorial terms of trade at the expense of manufac-
turing industries (Figure 4). Evidently, many manufacturing companies
wasted too much time before they painfully realized the substantial dete-
rioration of their export performance. When some institutes in the early
1980s doubted the competitive position of the German export industries,
this«was categorically rejected by the representatives of these industries.19
It needed a decade until they conceded that Germany's industrial compa-
nies suffered from a weakening of their export performance.
Figure 4 - Real Exchange Rate and Double Factorial Terms of Trade
between the Manufacturing and the Service Sectors 1970-
1985(1975=100)
Internal terms of trado
b
aBased on unit labour costs. - Value added per working hour in manufacturing and in ser-
vices.
Source: Central Statistical Office; Deutsche Bundesbank; own calcula-
tions.
With respect to industrial restructuring there was consensus of opinion
among all institutes that the majority of companies did not respond to the
appreciation shock adequately. Adjustment — measured in terms of inter-
sectoral shifts of production and employment — declined remarkably
(Figure 5).
7 Growth in the branches that had been given most support for
This was clearly expressed by HWWA: "If short-term cyclical fluctuations in production
and employment are excluded, it becomes clear that structural change has consistently
slackened during the 70s and 80s and that the employment structure has since become
relatively robust" [cited from BMWi 1988: 54].20
economic expansion slowed down considerably. The normal process in
which declining branches were replaced by fast-growing and job-creating
branches nearly came to a standstill.
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What we can learn from this is the following: if changes are precipitated
by external shocks such as a substantial appreciation of the currency, the
companies first tend to react defensively rather than offensively. While
markets demand more flexibility, producers — employers as well as em-
ployees — demand more stability.
The crucial point has been — and this divided the institutes once more
into two fractions — the employment problem. IfW and HWWA always
arguicl that structural change could be a positive sum game — provided
labour markets were flexible enough. In this respect, the other institutes21
were less optimistic. In particular, ifo suspected that the capacity of the
service sector would not be large enough to compensate for employment
losses in the manufacturing sector.
This controversy illuminates some shortcomings of the adjustment proc-
ess: from 1970 to 1995, more than one quarter of working places in
manufacturing industries have been lost. While these industries were
flexible enough to reduce their staff adequately, service industries were
too inflexible to provide relief for the labour market. The right answer to
the ongoing de-industrialization would have been a resolute strategy of
deregulating service industries, as it was urgently demanded by IfW and
HWWA. Many markets for services are not structured along competitive
lines. Efforts to dismantle the barriers to competition have only been
moderately successful to date.
4 Pressing-down or Pushing-up Economic Activity?
Conventional wisdom suggests that economic activity will be negatively
affected if a currency is going through a phase of appreciation. It is argued
that increasingly intensive competition will reduce the profitability in manu-
facturing industries compared to the past. In particular, if the real ex-
change rate moves to such a peak that only exporters with the lowest
price elasticity can survive, there might not be enough incentives, flexibil-
ity and time for overcoming difficulties through internal efforts such as ra-
tionalization and efficiency improvement. In particular, in the short and
medium term, when export earnings are substantially reduced, innova-
tions can be seriously hampered.
The basic idea behind this argument is that there is a break-even ex-
change rate allowing companies to adapt. If the actual exchange rate ex-22
ceeds the break-even exchange rate this is seen as an appreciation well
beyond any reasonable efforts on part of companies. However, a break-
even exchange rate is not a fixed value. According to long-term observa-
tions, it follows the effective exchange rate little by little as the apprecia-
tion goes on — indicating that companies are, albeit gradually, coming to
terms with and are becoming able to adapt to it.
8 In contrast to conven-
tional notions, it is likely that a substantial appreciation of the currency will
accelerate the rate of technical progress. In the framework of the product
cycle model, e.g., it will shorten the product cycle and positively influence
the rate of innovation. For this it is likely that an appreciation-induced
higher degree of competitive pressure will make the management more
receptive to best-practice techniques. As a result, the appreciation can
become also a flywheel for structural change and economic growth.
The causal relationship between exchange rate variability, structural
change and economic growth was another controversial issue in elaborat-
ing the institutes' Structural Reports. This can mainly be explained by the
different paradigms they traditionally adhered to. For the Keynesian-
oriented DIW, e.g., an exchange rate induced decline in the growth rate
caused the slow pace of structural change observed in the 1970s and
1980s: "Macroeconomic and structural problems are not mutually inde-
pendent. The persistence of an inadequate level of macroeconomic de-
mand leads to losses of existing jobs for which no sufficient replacements
are created in the process of structural change.... Enterprises offering
new products have a hard time when demand is lacking ... Therefore, it is
At present, in Germany the break-even exchange rate for exports is generally regarded
to average 150 DM/100 $ or thereabouts. In Japan it is 100 Yen/100 $, much lower than
what: was calculated for the PPP-based exchange rate one year ago (180 Yen) [Japan
Development Bank 1995].23
quite explainable that under the condition of insufficient demand the pace
of structural change will only be slow" [1987:4]. In contrast, for the
Schumpeterian-oriented IfW the lack of demand resulted from backlogs in
adjustment: "A higher rate of economic growth can only be achieved by a
higher tempo of structural change: by developing new products and new
production technologies and by widening capacities — in anticipating fu-
ture demand" [1989: 7]. According to this view, coping with a strong cur-
rency is not a demand but a supply problem.
The suggestion that the slow pace of structural change in the 1970s and
1980s was caused by poor macroeconomic conditions is not convincing in
its general form. As HWWA correctly pointed out in its third Structural
Report: "Stagnation and unemployment (also) occur when the production
capacities established by the enterprises do not develop in line with the
preferences of the population, the comparative advantages in interna-
tional competition and the relative scarcity of resources" [BMWi 1988].
Looking back on ten years' Structural Reports, IfW came to the following
conclusion: "The German economy is not (yet) structurally sound. Neither
has it regained an adequate level of growth, nor have job opportunities
been exhausted. It will move into the nineties heavily burdened with un-
solved structural problems. The situation resembles that of ten years ago
when the Structural Reports started" [cited from BMWi 1988: 102].
IV Conclusions: What Lessons for Japan?
Many years of a strong DM suggest that for an adaptive economy the ex-
change rate
• is moving alongside an upward trend rather than a random walk,24
• is governed by real rather than monetary factors, as it has substan-
tially exceeded the purchasing power parity,
• is — by and large — positively affecting the economy as the appre-
ciation is increasing the pressure to adjust.
Moreover, as the adaptability of the German economy has been put to the
test many times, it seems to be only logical that markets prove their confi-
dence by appreciating the DM to reach a higher level.
To put it in a nutshell: a strong currency can signahboth weakness and
strength. It can be an indication of a considerable adjustment backlog and
of a considerable capability of the economy for catching-up.
In the light of this understanding, Japan's business community and politi-
cal establishment should take the high valuation of the Yen as a chance.
They should no longer portray themselves as the victims of the vagaries
of the foreign currency markets and of the neglectful policies of their
western allies, especially the United States. The current exchange rate is
without any doubt a heavy burden for companies. It is understandable that
they would like to have a weaker Yen. However, businessmen and policy
makers cannot do more than talk about it. Actually, measures for pressing
down the Yen
9 have left markets totally unimpressed.
Like the German economy, the Japanese economy has many times suc-
cessfully demonstrated its capability of adaptation to structural change
caused by external shocks. In particular, export industries with the most to
lose from a strong Yen and which usually complain loudest have been
On the monetary policy front, the official discount rate has been reduced to Vz %, the
lowest figure ever recorded in Japan and elsewhere.25
able to cope with it better than they want to admit. They have rapidly
managed a remarkable adjustment process. For this, Japan's fast
changing commodity pattern of foreign trade is a good proof: exports of
consumer goods have declined in relative importance to those of capital
and intermediate goods, partly in demand by overseas subsidiaries of Ja-
pan-based companies.
However, in one respect at least, Japan's long-term performance appears
to fail to match the very best —just like Germany and other European
countries: unemployment, although still low compared to European stan-
dards, is rising. The "Japanese approach" to what has been called hol-
lowing-out — i.e. shifting labour-intensive manufacturing to low-wage
countries elsewhere, leaving high technology and research-intensive pro-
duction in highly-educated Japan — must sooner or later inflict long-term
damage on the industry's capacity. This approach now has to be comple-
mented by the long-awaited measures designed to fresh up the domestic
economy. The "Financial Times" [1995] certainly met the point: "Yen relief
must begin at home".
At the 25th Yomiui Symposium on the International Economy held on
May 19, 1995, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Yasuo Matsushita
[1995] correctly sketched the way: "In the meantime, Japan, as a country
with a strong currency, must work to transform its economy to make it
more robust so that it may withstand exchange rate fluctuations of a cer-
tain degree. ... To do so, it is necessary for the Japanese government to
seriously carry out measures to alter the economic structure, including de-
regulation. While the significance of these measures is often highlighted
in the context of stabilizing exchange rates or rectifying external imbal-
ances, I should like to stress that these measures are necessary to26
achieve a more fundamental objective, namely, a stable development of
our domestic economy".
According to Yoshio Suzuki (1996), Chief Counselor of the influential No-
mura Research Institute, Japan is now at a historical cross-road compa-
rable to the Meiji Restoration of 130 years ago and its defeat in World
War II half a century ago. Thanks to these events, Japan was able to
catch up with the most advanced industrialized nations. However, the
previous historical transformations have obviously reached the limits of
their effectiveness. They have established an "Iron Triangle" of politicians,
bureaucrats and businessmen, who tend to postpone reforms rather than
promote them. "This, indeed, is the major problem that must be solved in
order to realize structural economic reforms in Japan".
In this respect, Germany cannot be a model for Japan. In cutting tax rates
and subsidies, in deregulating domestic goods and factor markets and in
reorganizing and privatizing public activities, it has made only little pro-
gress. Germany's "Iron Triangle", although often divided and involved in
internal conflicts, has in principle homogeneous interests: to preserve the
status quo. So far, Japan and Germany have been quite similar—like
two brothers who have grown up in the same environment. Both have to
learn yet that slow structural change is the cause of their common prob-
lems, not the cure.27
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